Chapter 6: empty, full, initiative, concentration and weak points

Chapter 6 examines why a force can be superior overall and yet be at a disadvantage at the point of encounter. Empty and full describe relative conditions: preparation, availability and endurance. Initiative is about influencing those conditions without losing the ability to adapt.

What empty and full mean in a military situation

The Chinese title of chapter 6 brings together xu and shi, empty and full. Lionel Giles presents it in his 1910 translation as weak and strong points. That choice points towards a specific military relationship: where a force meets resistance and where there is a chance to act to advantage.

Within the block on positioning and tactics: chapters 4 to 7, this chapter studies how the relationship between opposing forces changes. “Full” does not mean invincible, and “empty” does not require a place to be literally unoccupied. What matters is the capacity available to respond to a particular action.

The opening contrasts the one who arrives first and waits rested with the one who arrives later and must hurry. Order of arrival changes the conditions of the encounter. The point is not that any position occupied first is good, but to recognise the labour and fatigue that a decision imposes on each force.

An advantage may also depend on timing. A well-attended position now may receive less support later, while an observed weakness may disappear before action is taken. For that reason the chapter does not offer a permanent map of strengths and shortages.

The relationship with Shi, Zheng and Qi in chapter 5 lies in the combination of means and effects. Here the question focuses on where and when capacity is concentrated. An apparently powerful arrangement may be of little use if its elements do not manage to support one another at the necessary point.

The criterion is also not to always seek out the smaller adversary. A weak element may be of no importance to the objective, while another is necessary to sustain the whole. Weakness is a relevant condition only when it relates to what is being sought.

How initiative changes the balance of forces

The text attributes to the skilful fighter the ability to shape the opponent’s movements rather than merely respond. It explains that initiative through the possibility of making the adversary attend to something that needs protecting. The principle does not amount to controlling their will: it requires understanding which decisions they regard as necessary.

Uncertainty about the place of encounter also alters the balance. If a force believes it must prepare in many places, its resources are spread out. If the other side can gather its own in one place, the local relationship may differ from the comparison between total numbers.

Concentration should not be confused with bringing everyone together without regard for timing. The chapter links mutual support with knowing the place and moment of the encounter. Forces available in different positions may not be available together when needed.

A hypothetical case makes the reasoning clear. In an abstract simulation, one side has sixty counters and the other has one hundred. The second side divides its counters evenly across five zones: twenty in each. If the first side gathers its sixty counters in a single zone, the initial comparison there would be sixty against twenty.

Arithmetic has neither created new resources nor proved a victory. It depends on the counters being comparable, on them being able to concentrate in time, and on the other eighty not intervening. It also assumes that the chosen zone matters to the aim of the exercise.

Now let us change one condition: the second side keeps part of its resources in reserve, ready to move. The local relationship can no longer be calculated using only the twenty counters placed at the outset. The example shows why one must study response capacity and not merely a snapshot of the distribution.

One’s own concentration can, moreover, leave other places less attended to. No distribution avoids all costs. The manoeuvres in chapter 7 explain the difficulties of turning a desired advantage into movements that preserve means, coordination and capability on arrival.

Adapting without turning a previous victory into a formula

The chapter distinguishes visible dispositions from what makes the result possible. Observing a force’s final movement does not necessarily reveal all the conditions that made it useful. Copying it in another situation may preserve its appearance and lose its reason for being.

The image of water expresses that variation: its course responds to the terrain, just as military action must attend to the opposing situation. The metaphor of water in strategy develops the comparison. Here it is enough to keep in mind that adapting requires recognising conditions, not giving up organisation.

Not having a fixed form also does not mean acting without criteria. The objective makes it possible to assess which changes matter; the information shows whether the arrangement remains suitable. Changing constantly for the mere sake of being unpredictable could undo the coordination needed to seize an opportunity.

A business reading appears in the strategy of a start-up facing a giant. The comparison can help distinguish total resources from attention devoted to a specific need. It does not prove that a small company has an advantage by definition, nor that the larger one is incapable of responding.

The search for market niches sets out another limit of the analogy. A poorly served space may contain a need, but it may also lack sufficient demand. The absence of competitors does not by itself confirm an opportunity. That test belongs to business analysis, not to a prediction from the ancient text.

In any of these adaptations, the question keeps a recognisable structure: what capacity exists at a given place and time, what supports it, and how it may change. The answer must be reviewed when the conditions that justified the concentration change.

A weak point is not a permanent label. Before acting on it, you have to check that it still exists, that it matters to the objective, and that your own force can reach it in a position to exploit it.

View all articles in Sun Tzu's Tactics: dispositions and manoeuvres in chapters 4 to 7