A favourable position can cease to be favourable if reaching it exhausts or scatters the army. Chapter 7 examines that tension between the intended benefit and the cost of movement. Its recommendations include routes, communication and prudence when the adversary seems to be withdrawing.
The shortest route does not always offer the best arrival
Chapter 7, in Lionel Giles's 1910 translation, presents manoeuvring as a difficult activity because it must turn the indirect into the direct, and difficulty into advantage. The issue is not simply covering less distance: what matters is arriving in a situation that makes it possible to achieve the objective.
In the block on positioning and tactics: chapters 4 to 7, this reading completes the problem of deployment. A force may identify a favourable position and lose that advantage while trying to occupy it. Movement is part of the comparison; it is not a later formality.
The text links the detour with the possibility of diverting the other side's attention through an apparent advantage. Leaving later and arriving earlier expresses a relative outcome against the adversary. It does not mean that any longer route will by itself reduce travel time.
The difference between a direct and an indirect route does not automatically amount to Zheng and Qi either. Here the focus is on routes, delays and competition for a position. A winding route can be predictable, and a movement along a straight road can prove unexpected. The shape of the journey does not settle its function.
Imagine a fictional exercise in which two routes lead to the same point. The shorter one includes a step that requires waiting and temporarily dividing the column. The second adds distance, but allows the formation to keep moving as a whole. It cannot be chosen by looking only at length: one has to compare the effective arrival and the resources that will still be available then.
The relation to emptiness and fullness in chapter 6 appears when asking what force will be able to gather at the necessary moment. Having more troops at the start of the march does not mean having more capacity at the end of it.
Speed, supplies and coordination during movement
The chapter contrasts advancing with all resources and splitting off a force that hurries in search of advantage. The first option may arrive too late; the second risks losing the support of its resources. Giles acknowledges textual difficulties in the wording, but retains the warning against a prolonged march without supplies.
Forced marches are shown alongside dispersal: the hardiest move ahead and those who are exhausted fall behind. The treatise uses distances and proportions of arrival to express the seriousness of the problem. They are not a performance table that allows losses to be calculated exactly in any army or on any route.
The lesson can be framed as an assessment question: what is being sacrificed in order to arrive sooner? If the destination requires action with resources that are still far away, the speed of the vanguard does not prove that the force has gained the desired advantage.
It also mentions knowledge of the intentions of other rulers, the features of the terrain and the use of local guides. Movement depends on information that is not obtained by counting soldiers. A workable route can lose its value if it leads to a poorly understood position.
The comparisons with wind, forest, fire and mountain describe different qualities of military behaviour. The text alternates speed, cohesion, intensity and firmness. Reading only the image of the wind would reduce the chapter to a recommendation to always move quickly, which the other images do not support.
Communication receives its own development. The chapter includes a formulation attributed to a book on military administration: when ordinary voice and sight are not enough, sound instruments and banners are used. The aim is to make instructions understandable for a large force.
Coordination limits both the individual advance of the boldest and the isolated retreat of the timid. In the argument, an organised force needs its members to act in a compatible way. One person's courage does not necessarily make up for the breaking up of the whole.
The text also attends to morale and fatigue. Its description of morning vigour and the wish to return at dusk belongs to that military exposition. It should not be turned into a psychological law applicable to everyone: what matters is observing the force's actual condition, not deciding it solely by the time of day.
Why an enemy retreat calls for caution
In the final section, warnings appear about a feigned flight, a decoy and an adversary that retains order and capability. The apparent opportunity needs interpretation. A withdrawal can change the space of the engagement without meaning the rival has lost control.
The chapter also advises leaving an opening to a surrounded force and not pressing an adversary driven to desperation to the limit. The military sense of caution is to avoid turning an advantage into a situation that intensifies the other side's resistance. It is not a promise of peaceful surrender.
Its transfer to negotiation with a dignified exit is a contemporary interpretation. In a negotiation, it may be useful for the other party to have an acceptable alternative, but it is not appropriate to identify a counterpart with a surrounded army or to present "golden bridges" as a literal quotation from this passage.
These cautions require the decision to be reviewed as the situation changes. The flexibility of command in chapter 8 continues that issue: an expected advantage does not justify clinging to the initial movement when the conditions that made it reasonable no longer hold.
To interpret a movement, one must distinguish what is observed from the explanation attributed to it. The reading of signals in chapter 9 continues that question from the terrain and the adversary's behaviour.
View all articles in Sun Tzu's Tactics: dispositions and manoeuvres in chapters 4 to 7
