Chapter 12 begins by classifying fire attacks and ends by questioning wars undertaken in anger. Between these two extremes, the text distinguishes available means, the effects obtained, and justified decisions. The fifth mode requires close attention because commentators do not interpret it in a single way.
What distinguishes the classification of the five attacks
The chapter 12 opening enumeration combines material targets with a mode whose reading is disputed. In Lionel Giles’s 1910 translation, the five forms refer to soldiers in their camp, reserves, baggage trains, stores, and fire cast among the opposing forces.
This section opens the block of fire and intelligence: chapters 12 and 13. Fire is studied here as a destructive means within a campaign, not as a general metaphor for enthusiasm or initiative. The classification makes it possible to observe which resources the treatise considers vulnerable.
- Soldiers in camp. The first mode directs violence against people and against the place where they are concentrated. Its meaning should not be diluted by turning it into a simple action against empty facilities.
- Reserves and provisions. The second affects resources accumulated to sustain the army. In Giles’s notes, Du Mu mentions food, fuel and fodder.
- Baggage trains. The third corresponds to the means that accompany the movement of the force. Translating it only as equipment would obscure the mobile dimension of those resources.
- Arsenals and stores. The fourth refers to goods held in storage. The difference from transport lies in their arrangement, although part of the material content may coincide.
- Fire cast among the enemy. That is the interpretation Giles adopts for the fifth mode. Unlike the previous ones, its wording specifically describes a way of delivering the fire.
The fifth category cannot be fixed without mentioning the translation problem. Giles sets out several explanations and acknowledges that none is entirely satisfactory to him. Among them is a reading related to roads or supply lines, defended by some commentators. His own version follows another interpretation.
So “routes” is not an invented category without precedent, but neither is it the solution adopted by Giles. Presenting it as an unquestionable translation would erase a documented difference. What matters is to identify the edition and preserve the attribution when explaining an alternative.
The classification also does not offer five separate weapons. People, reserves and baggage are targets; they do not describe manufacturing mechanisms. Likewise, “arsenal” here denotes a weapons store and does not allow technologies not mentioned by the enumeration to be added to the passage.
A destructive effect is not the same as a guaranteed advantage
The chapter’s development introduces material and environmental conditions, as well as the adversary’s response. Its role in the argument is to limit the idea that merely having a resource is enough to obtain the desired result. The intended effect may still fail to appear.
One of its warnings considers that, despite the fire, the opposing forces may remain calm. This observation matters because it prevents us from assuming their disorganisation. The tactical interpretation of the passage distinguishes the visible disturbance of the surroundings from the actual loss of military capacity.
The text also refers to seasons, winds and the Moon’s positions. Those references form part of its framework of observation. Reading them as historical documentation does not require turning them into a current weather forecast or reproducing them as operational instructions.
It then compares fire and water in terms of their effects on forces and their resources. In Giles, the interruption of movement by water is distinguished from the destruction of goods attributed to fire. The contrast describes functions within the argument, not a universal statement about all the damage either element may cause.
This attention to the opposing response is connected with the nine situations of chapter 11. Pressure and danger do not necessarily produce the behaviour expected by the person who introduces them. A destructive resource does not remove the need to judge what is happening.
Why anger does not justify starting a war
The ending shifts the focus from the means used to the decision to fight. The ruler and the general must not use troops to satisfy personal anger. The warning does not require a lack of emotion: it rejects the idea that a momentary feeling is a sufficient reason to put lives at risk.
The argument distinguishes two timescales. Anger may pass and displeasure may change; the deaths caused do not vanish when that happens. The image of the destroyed state reinforces that difference between the change in the decision-maker’s mood and the consequences borne by others.
This is how the connection with the risks of deciding in anger and ego is understood. If the real motive is to respond to an insult, a later explanation about prestige may conceal it without adding any concrete advantage. The review must examine the objective, not merely change the words used to defend the decision.
In a hypothetical example, a ruler receives an insulting message and demands an immediate military response. The message may have wounded his pride, but it does not show that security conditions have changed. Separating the two facts makes it possible to ask what threat exists and what consequences a response would have.
Transferring that caution to the pause before anger and stress is a day-to-day adaptation, not a psychological treatment contained in the book. The passage offers a criterion for the justification of acts; not a method for eliminating emotions.
The need to understand the situation before committing resources continues in the five classes of spies in chapter 13. The order of reading moves from the capacity to cause harm to the information needed to decide, without presenting either as an automatic guarantee of victory.
The final caution forces us to look beyond the immediate result. Being able to carry out an action and having sufficient reasons to do so are different matters, especially when the consequences cannot be put right.
View all articles in Espionage and fire attacks in Sun Tzu: chapters 12 and 13
