Chapter 3: Attack Priorities, Command and Intelligence

Chapter 3 orders military options by what they allow you to achieve and preserve. The hierarchy begins with the adversary's plans and places siege last. The argument goes on to cover the balance of forces, the relationship between general and ruler, and the knowledge needed to decide.

Why attack options are not interchangeable

In Lionel Giles' 1910 translation, Chapter 3 begins by preferring to keep the adversary's country and forces intact rather than destroy them. That principle helps interpret the later hierarchy: achieving an objective and laying waste to what you mean to act upon do not produce the same result.

This idea does not amount to a general rejection of the use of force. The treatise continues to examine how to subdue the adversary. The meaning of supreme military excellence develops that ideal further; to read the full chapter, one must continue to the criteria that guide the choice of means.

The order can be represented by this scheme. Each level acts on a different object, so it is not enough to rename an operation in order to place it in a higher category.

  1. Acting on plans: foiling the intention or the conditions on which the adversary's project depends.
  2. Acting on alliances: preventing the adversary from gaining or gathering the support that strengthens their position.
  3. Facing the army: resolving the opposition by clashing with its deployed forces.
  4. Besieging cities: committing means against a fortified position, an option the text advises avoiding whenever possible.

The first priority requires understanding what the adversary is trying to achieve. An action may inconvenience them without changing their plan. The difference between causing a nuisance and altering the conditions of their project explains what it means to attack strategy, without reducing that concept to any deception or show of force.

At the second level, Giles translates the passage as preventing the union of enemy forces and explains it through separation from their allies. The role of alliances in Sun Tzu makes it possible to examine that dimension. The brief statement does not list bribes or a set of diplomatic manoeuvres that could be added as a literal translation.

Siege receives a material explanation: equipment preparation, prolonged labour, and the risk that impatience will lead the general to order an expensive assault. Its lower place in the hierarchy is linked to the cost of war in Chapter 2. Destruction and time consumed can reduce the value of what is gained.

Available force and the responsibilities of command

The chapter also distinguishes situations of superiority, equality, and inferiority. It sets out numerical proportions and links different possibilities of action to them. It does not offer a formula that lets you enter two quantities and obtain the outcome of a battle. The comparison must preserve the other conditions the treatise itself examines.

Giles also records Zhang Yu's clarification that a numerical difference may be offset by other qualities. This is the comment of an interpreter, not an extra figure in the text. Its value lies in preventing the list from being read as though all fighters and situations were equivalent.

A hypothetical example makes the limit clearer. Two forces with the same number of members may be in different states of readiness, dispersion, or supply. Equality in numbers answers one question, but leaves others open. The chapter does not require battle merely because a numerical comparison seems favourable.

The general's capability is linked to the strength of the state. The text then examines three ways in which the ruler can harm their army. The first consists in ordering advance or retreat without knowing that the force cannot do so. The problem is not the existence of an order, but its detachment from real possibilities.

The second warning concerns governing the army while ignoring its particular conditions. Giles interprets the third as appointing officers without judgement or understanding of the circumstances. Both place part of the risk within the organisation itself: a force may lose coherence before the adversary defeats it.

This criticism of interference does not establish that the general has unlimited authority over any political matter. The issue being examined is the competence to decide in a military situation. Confusing operational autonomy with absence of responsibility would go beyond what the passage explains.

What information does the one choosing an option need

Towards the end, five conditions appear for recognising the possibility of victory: knowing when to fight and when to refrain, handling forces of different sizes, maintaining a shared will, being prepared against an unprepared adversary, and having a capable general without harmful interference from the ruler.

This enumeration belongs to Chapter 3. It does not repeat the five factors of Chapter 1, although some themes are related. Its purpose here is to bring together the capabilities needed to choose and execute an option; it does not grant an automatic guarantee to anyone who claims to possess them.

The relationship between preparation and opportunity continues in the arrangements of Chapter 4. Being organised makes it possible to avoid certain weaknesses of one's own, but it does not oblige the adversary to leave an opportunity available. That is why the chapter's analysis does not end with a general order to attack.

The final maxim about knowing the other and knowing oneself must be read in that context. Information about oneself helps to recognise limits; information about the adversary makes it possible to assess what they are trying to do and the means they have at their disposal. The passage does not assign statistical percentages to each combination of knowledge.

The hierarchy provides guidance, but it needs a diagnosis. Without understanding the adversary's objective, their support, and the capability of one's own force, it is impossible to justify why one option would be preferable to another. A list of priorities does not replace the information needed to apply it.

Before assessing the effectiveness of an action, it is worth specifying what it aims to change: a plan, a support relationship, a deployed force, or a fortified position. That distinction prevents us from calling any favourable outcome strategic.

View all articles in Sun Tzu's strategic preparation: Chapters 1 to 3