Sun Tzu and Jomini: concentration of forces, terrain and adaptation

Jomini organises strategy through bases, lines and decisive points. Sun Tzu also relates positions, movements and concentration, though he uses different categories. The comparison makes it possible to examine what a spatial scheme explains and what still depends on circumstances.

The comparison between Sun Tzu and Antoine-Henri Jomini is not resolved by opposing geometry and psychology. Both relate action to positions, movements and the adversary’s conditions. Within Sun Tzu compared with other strategists, the aim is to examine how these elements are ordered and how far their principles extend.

The texts used are The Art of War by Sun Tzu, in Lionel Giles’s translation, and Jomini’s Summary of the Art of War, published in English as The Art of War in the translation by G. H. Mendell and W. P. Craighill. The Spanish explanations are paraphrases.

Bases and lines of operations: what Jomini’s geometry describes

In Article XVIII, Jomini defines the base of operations as the part of territory that provides resources and reinforcements, supports the army and allows its advance or retreat. It does not necessarily mean a building or a single depot. Its function depends on its relation to the operations.

Article XXI distinguishes zones and lines of operations. A line is not just any road drawn on a map: it is related to the army’s campaigns within a zone. Several routes used by its divisions can form part of the same line of operations.

Lines of communication, for their part, connect positions and parts of the force. Keeping these terms separate avoids turning the whole explanation into a matter of choosing the shortest route. A route may be short and yet not adequately support the movement intended.

Jomini defines interior lines through a relation of time: they make it possible to concentrate forces before the adversary can bring a larger concentration to bear. Their value does not depend solely on occupying the centre of a shape. Mobility and the ability to assemble are part of the concept.

This distinction can be understood through a hypothetical diagram. Two nearby positions on the map may be separated by an obstacle that prevents rapid communication. Two more distant positions may maintain a workable connection. Geometric distance and the actual possibility of support are not the same measure.

Sun Tzu sets out another way of relating movement and outcome in chapter 7. The manoeuvres of chapter 7 examine the route together with the difficulties of arriving in a position to act. The comparison brings together a common question without attributing Jomini’s technical vocabulary to the Chinese treatise.

Concentration and terrain: similarities with limits

In the exposition of his general principle, Jomini proposes gathering the mass of forces on decisive points and confronting enemy detachments with it. He also adds the timing and energy of execution. The approach is not exhausted by counting troops: it needs to explain where and when that concentration can have consequences.

Chapter 6 of Sun Tzu also relates one’s own concentration to the adversary’s division. This similarity prevents him from being presented as an author interested only in changing perceptions. The material disposition of forces is part of his reasoning.

However, to concentrate does not mean gathering everything anywhere. As an explanation of the problem, accumulation can make movement harder or leave other obligations unresolved. What matters is the relation between the forces available and a specific task, not the isolated quantity.

Article XIX of Jomini distinguishes points whose value comes from geography and others whose importance depends on the situation of the forces. A place does not automatically have the same value in every campaign. The objective and the relations of position alter what it means to occupy or lose it.

Sun Tzu likewise links conduct with spatial conditions. The six terrains of chapter 10 show that accessibility, passes and distances are not mere scenery. Command must recognise how they shape the possibilities of action.

The similarity does not turn the classifications into mutual translations. A terrain category in Sun Tzu does not necessarily correspond to a Jominian base or line. To compare them, it is necessary to state what relation each term describes: between places, between forces, or between a position and the task assigned.

It is also worth avoiding letting the outcome retrospectively decide which place was "decisive". To assess an interpretation, one must explain why that point mattered before the result and what alternatives were available. Naming it after a victory does not replace that explanation.

General principles, human factors and adaptation

Jomini does not present war as an exact science without human involvement. In the conclusion of his work and in the supplement, he insists on the influence of character, the abilities of commanders and the passions. At the same time, he maintains strong confidence in his general principles. Both statements belong to his position and should be read together.

The tension is instructive: a principle can organise recurring problems without determining every outcome by itself. Recognising that it is wise to concentrate still leaves open the identification of the point, the real availability of forces and the possibility of carrying out what is planned.

In Article XXI, Jomini considers lines that arise from events that alter the initial plan. That category shows that his vocabulary also includes changes during a campaign. A geometric description does not necessarily mean the line should be maintained once its conditions disappear.

Sun Tzu formulates adaptation through other images and distinctions. Chapter 6 rejects a fixed form independent of the adversary. Read alongside Jomini, the contrast makes it possible to separate a framework that helps observation from a recipe that claims to decide before the situation is known.

We can imagine a fictional plan whose main route is no longer available. Keeping to the drawn line would preserve the appearance of the project, but not its viability. Revising it requires checking which connections remain open and what objective is still achievable. Changing the line does not necessarily mean abandoning the purpose.

Sun Tzu versus Clausewitz develops the problem of the difficulties of execution through friction. That contrast should not be used to erase what Jomini does recognise about uncertainty and human factors, nor to attribute a shared vocabulary to the three authors.

The useful question when faced with a strategic scheme is what it represents and what it leaves unresolved. A map can show spatial relations; by itself it does not prove the availability of resources, comprehension of orders or the enemy’s response. Clarifying those limits makes it possible to compare Jomini and Sun Tzu without turning one into a formula and the other into inexplicable intuition.

Sun Tzu versus Musashi allows the discussion to continue through observation, rhythm and learning, distinguishing individual execution from the coordination of forces.

View all articles in Sun Tzu compared with Clausewitz, Machiavelli, Musashi and Jomini